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Education, Educational Policy and Growth
Abstract
?This paper reviews the recent theoretical and empirical literature that relates education to growth, and
draws some lessons for the Swedish experience. First, the ?human capital accumulation? approach is
discussed: agents decide, at each moment of their lives, to forego time or resources to improve their
future productivity. The quality of the educational system is argued to be a crucial determinant of the
decision to invest in human capital and of the growth rate of the economy. Hence, qualified teachers and
appropriate incentive schemes within the schooling sectors are important for the long-run performance
of the economy. Next, the trade-off between basic innovation (promoted by a restricted subset of
economic activities) and learning-by-doing (which occurs at a more diffuse level in the economy) is
analysed. It is argued that the former can be fostered by investments in ?elite? research institutions,
while the latter depends on the average educational attainment of the working population. Finally, the
relationship between education, growth and inequality is discussed. The second part of the paper
analyses recent trends in educational attainments in Sweden. Data show that enrolment rates in tertiary
education in Sweden have lagged behind the major industrialised countries during the 1980s.
Quantitatively, however, this is unlikely to be a major explanation of the productivity slowdown
experienced by Sweden after 1970. But it is emphasised that (i) low educational premiums may harm
incentives for people to invest in human capital; and (ii) low relative wages and low-power incentive
schemes for teachers may cause a deterioration in the quality of education with negative effects on
long-run growth.
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Kjetil Storesletten and Fabrizio Zilibotti*
Summary
 This paper reviews the recent theoretical and empirical literature
that relates education to growth, and draws some lessons for the
Swedish experience. First, the “human capital accumulation” ap-
proach is discussed: agents decide, at each moment of their lives, to
forego time or resources to improve their future productivity. The
quality of the educational system is argued to be a crucial determinant
of the decision to invest in human capital and of the growth rate of
the economy. Hence, qualified teachers and appropriate incentive
schemes within the schooling sectors are important for the long-run
performance of the economy. Next, the trade-off between basic in-
novation (promoted by a restricted subset of economic activities) and
learning-by-doing (which occurs at a more diffuse level in the econ-
omy) is analysed. It is argued that the former can be fostered by in-
vestments in “elite” research institutions, while the latter depends on
the average educational attainment of the working population. Finally,
the relationship between education, growth and inequality is dis-
cussed.
The second part of the paper analyses recent trends in educational
attainments in Sweden. Data show that enrolment rates in tertiary
education in Sweden have lagged behind the major industrialised
countries during the 1980s. Quantitatively, however, this is unlikely to
be a major explanation of the productivity slowdown experienced by
Sweden after 1970. But it is emphasised that (i) low educational pre-
miums may harm incentives for people to invest in human capital;
and (ii) low relative wages and low-power incentive schemes for
teachers may cause a deterioration in the quality of education with
negative effects on long-run growth. 
* Kjetil Storesletten is a senior research fellow at the Institute for International Economic Studies,
Stockholm University. Fabrizio Zilibotti is a senior research fellow at the Institute for Interna-
tional Economic Studies, Stockholm University, and a professor at University of Southampton.
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Education, educational policy and
growth
Kjetil Storesletten and Fabrizio Zilibotti *
“The good Education of Youth has been esteemed by wise Men in all Ages, as
the surest Foundation of the Happiness both of private Families and of Com-
mon-wealths. Almost all Governments have therefore made it a principal Ob-
ject of their Attention, to establish and endow with proper Revenues, such
Seminaries of Learning, as might supply the succeeding Age with Men quali-
fied to serve the Public with Honour to themselves, and to their Country.”
Benjamin Franklin, 1749, Proposals Relating to the Education of Youth in
Pennsylvania.
Economic theory provides a number of reasons that help to explain
the importance of education for economic growth. In Section 1, we
will review the way in which education has been dealt with in eco-
nomic theory. However, the assessment of the quantitative impor-
tance of human capital and education in the growth process is an em-
pirical issue. A large body of empirical literature, part of which is re-
viewed in Section 2, has developed to address this important ques-
tion. The literature documents robust empirical evidence to show that
countries with a better educated labour force perform better in terms
of growth. The quality of education also seems to matter.
To better understand the implications of the theoretical and em-
pirical findings for the Swedish experience, we then discuss the basic
facts about Swedish economic growth and human capital accumula-
tion in Section 3. It is a striking fact that Sweden exhibited a remarka-
bly strong growth performance between 1870 and 1970, while growth
slowed down significantly thereafter (Lindbeck, 2000). In this context,
we provide an assessment of the role played by human capital accu-
* We thank Lars Calmfors, Martin Flodén and Mats Persson for valuable comments, and Tho-
mas Eisensee, Christina Lönnblad and Marcus Salomonsson for technical assistance on this proj-
ect.
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mulation in this slow-down. We summarise the main conclusions and
the policy advice which we believe can be inferred from this analysis
in Section 4.
1. The theoretical growth literature
The recent economic literature has examined, from a variety of per-
spectives, the role of education and learning in understanding tech-
nological innovation and long-run economic growth. Earlier “neo-
classical” theories, as developed in the late 1950s and early 1960s,
identified the accumulation of physical capital as the engine of eco-
nomic growth. A major prediction of this approach is that the growth
of income per capita would fade away in the long run. The reason is
that, on the one hand, the only source of growth is the process of
savings and investments, which increases the stock of capital per em-
ployee in the economy over time. On the other hand, (net) invest-
ment per employee is predicted to decline over time, and fall to zero
in the long run. This decline in investment is attributable to the fall in
the marginal productivity of capital over time as the economy grows
and its capital intensity (capital per employee) increases.1
The prediction that economies would fall into stagnation in the
long run is contradicted by the observation that the process of growth
has continued steadily in the industrialised world for about two centu-
ries. This criticism has been the motivation for the new theory of
economic growth which was started in the late 1980s, following the
contributions of Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). The problem had in
fact already been noticed long before. Solow (1956) formalised the
idea that growth would not die off in the long run if labour produc-
tivity grew over time, due to technical progress. This progress, how-
ever, was postulated rather than explained within the framework of
traditional growth theory. Long-run growth remained outside the
realm of the phenomena which economic theory attempted to ex-
plain. Overcoming this limitation, and providing a theory of the de-
terminants of long-run growth, was one of the main objectives of the
“new growth theory” research program.
1 More in general, economic theory predicts growth to vanish in the long run as long
as there are decreasing returns to the set of “reproducible” factors of production in
the economy. Non-reproducible factors of production (or factors in “exogenous
supply”) are those inputs whose accumulation and growth rate are not determined
by people's willingness to save and accumulate wealth.
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In this new paradigm, long-run growth depends on a set of eco-
nomic decisions and incentives. Among them, education has acquired
a central role. When decisions of skill acquisition (via education,
training, etc.) are explicitly embedded into the theory, the economy
can continue to grow even when the stock of labour is limited. La-
bour productivity increases over time not only because a larger
amount of physical capital per employee becomes available, but also
because the stock of knowledge and skills embodied in each employee
grows over time. Expressed in the language of recent economic the-
ory, the accumulation of human rather than physical capital is the fun-
damental source of growth in modern economies.2
What is it, then, that gives rise to long-run economic growth? Or,
more precisely, why does labour productivity grow at a sustained rate?
The large body of recent research on the sources of economic growth
can be classified into three fundamental explanations.
1. Human capital accumulation;
2. Generation of new ideas;
3. Learning-by-doing.
In the human capital accumulation approach, economic agents purpose-
fully devote effort, time and resources to increase their productivity
(Lucas, 1988). Usually, this occurs through education. Human capital
investments are similar in nature to physical capital investments. Both
investments require that current consumption be foregone in order to
increase future productivity and consumption. Investments in physi-
cal capital require that certain resources which are available to the so-
ciety for consumption be set aside and used for the production of
capital goods. The mechanism for human capital accumulation is
similar: a share of the population of working age is withdrawn from
the labour force and, rather than producing consumption goods, is
put into schools − or other training institutions − in order to increase
future labour productivity. This theory generally emphasises the im-
portance of education to promote growth, and the potential causes
for a market economy to generate an undereducated labour force.
The generation of new ideas approach shares certain similarities with
the former, but also exhibits important differences. It stresses that in
order for a society to generate high growth, many workers must be
2 By human capital, economists refer to the skills and knowledge which individuals
acquire through education, training and experience, and which enhance the produc-
tivity of the worker who embodies them.
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devoted to the creation of new ideas and designs for more efficient
productive processes and more attractive consumption goods
(Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Grossman and Helpman, 1992). The cru-
cial determinant of growth is, then, the share of the workforce that is
employed in innovation-oriented industries and activities. These in-
clude both research and development (R&D) carried out by firms and
basic research carried out by specialised institutions.
This approach emphasises the need that (i) private firms find it
profitable to invest in research and innovation; (ii) a large share of the
workforce has the necessary skills to undertake these activities (engi-
neers, scientists, etc.); and (iii) universities and other institutions find
it rewarding to be actively involved in research, because of either
market incentives or publicly provided (targeted) support. While the
general notion of human capital accumulation would not discriminate
between different types of education, the “generation-of-ideas” ap-
proach would emphasise the importance of supporting higher educa-
tion and advanced research institutions to promote R&D-driven
growth.
Finally, according to the learning-by-doing approach, workers’ pro-
ductivity increases over time as workers are repeatedly confronted
with a particular task or problem, and learn how to cope with it effi-
ciently. Empirical research supports the view that the speed of the
learning process of a particular technique first increases over time,
and then decreases, as all its “secrets” unravel (Mansfield, 1968). As
new techniques are introduced, renewed opportunities for workers to
learn and improve new tasks become available. Capital accumulation
plus learning-by-doing can in fact lead to self-sustained growth, under
certain assumptions (Romer, 1986; Zilibotti, 1995), although empirical
research has found these assumptions to be rather unrealistic (Cabal-
lero and Jaffe, 1993).
The “learning-by-doing” approach emphasises work experience
rather than education as the main source of growth. Since education
implies less work experience, this approach suggests, in contrast to
the previous ones, that over-education might harm growth. This ar-
gument is controversial, however, since it seems reasonable that edu-
cated or well-trained workers learn more rapidly than non-educated
or untrained workers.
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1.1. Human capital accumulation
The modern version of growth theory with human capital accumula-
tion has been provided by Lucas (1988). In this model, people decide
at each moment in their life how to allocate their time between labour
activity and raising their productivity through education. In addition,
they decide how much of their income should be consumed and
saved respectively. Physical and human capital are similar in many
respects. The main difference is the technology that is used to pro-
duce them. While both capital and labour are necessary to produce
physical goods and capital, human capital production only requires
labour. This is intended to capture the notion that although educa-
tional activities require buildings, infrastructure, etc., the contribution
of human inputs—teachers, administrators, etc.—is generally more
significant than in the production of machinery and plants.
According to this theory, the growth rate in the long run only de-
pends on the productivity of the education sector and on the time
people devote to schooling. The latter, in turn, increases with the effi-
ciency of schooling. An increase in the efficiency of the provision of
education has, therefore, unambiguously positive effects on long-run
growth.
This theory has some interesting policy implications. Firstly, the
government should put a large emphasis on both the quality and effi-
ciency of educational services. Consider, for instance, a system like
the Swedish one, which is mainly based on public schools and in
which pay differentiation has been very limited. The reduction over
time of teachers’ relative wages—as has been observed in Sweden—
might imply a deterioration of educational standards, because intel-
lectually gifted persons have an incentive to work in the private sector
rather than to become teachers. The theory suggests that this trend is
destined to harm long-run growth by lowering the quality of schools
and the incentives for young people to invest in human capital.
Secondly, the effort of teachers also matters for the quality of
schools. Concerning this issue, we can learn from the recent moral
hazard literature dealing with incentives and work effort (Kreps,
1990). The starting point, here, is that employees (teachers) dislike
effort and that managers (i.e. university/school administrations) only
get an imperfect signal of the effort exerted by their employees
through observing the output (knowledge of graduating students). The
crux is to construct reward schemes such that the teachers have the
EDUCATION, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND GROWTH,
Kjetil Storesletten and Fabrizio Zilibotti
46
right incentives to do a good job and provide a high quality service. In
the Swedish schooling system, however, this type of monetary reward
has been virtually absent. In particular, teachers’ wages have been in-
dependent of any measure of the productivity of their teaching. This
holds true for all levels of schools, from kindergarten to university.
But how should one measure teachers’ and schools’ performance?
One approach, which is highly emphasised in other countries (e.g. the
UK and Canada), is to submit all students within the national system
to a common exam, and publicise the results school by school. In or-
der to avoid unfair conclusions, it is important that the information
about the scores of students leaving, say, high schools, is comple-
mented with the information about test scores taken when students
first entered the high school. One would then avoid that scores reflect
family background and other social factors, rather than the skills
learnt during the school period. Well-performing schools should be
assessed on the basis of the average improvement in the students’
ability during the school period, rather than on the absolute success
of graduating students. Schools which are most successful in im-
proving their students’ initial skills should be rewarded, while poorly
performing schools should be closely monitored, and their manage-
ment put under some kind of pressure (to be passed on to the local
teachers).
This test-oriented approach is not uncontroversial. The standard
argument against it is that it would bias the teaching and the students’
learning efforts towards skills that are quantifiable, i.e. facts and defi-
nitions (see Bishop, 1999). This could lead to a neglect of important
skills that cannot be quantified, like the scientific process, co-
operation, etc. The importance of this bias is a quantitative issue.
Bishop (1999) argues, based on Canadian data, that the biases in
teaching introduced by leaving examinations are quantitatively small
or non-existent. At the university level, it seems to us that such biases
should be even less relevant.
Thirdly, improvements in the education sector may have a positive
effect on growth even when they are costly, and their financing causes
other distortions. For instance, it can be shown explicitly from the
Lucas model that financing school improvements have, in most cases,
positive growth effects, even if they are financed by higher corporate
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taxes.3 This prediction contrasts with the popular notion − derived
from standard models using only physical capital − that only policies
affecting the profitability of business activities have effects on growth.
Lastly, we would like to point out an interesting feature of human
capital theories concerning the economic growth that arises as a result
of sudden changes in human or physical capital. In the long run, ac-
cording to this theory, the value of both physical and human capital
are constant proportions of GDP. If a country is suddenly hit by a
sudden event creating a physical capital shortage (i.e. a war or an
earthquake), physical capital accumulation will tend to be very high in
the aftermath of the shock, and the country will promptly return to
the old proportion of physical capital to GDP. A similar, though op-
posite, process would occur after a sudden event causing a shortage
of human capital (e.g. the exodus of engineers from East Germany at
the beginning of the cold war or the black plague).
The theory predicts, however, an important asymmetry between
the two cases. In particular, a country would recover more rapidly
from a destruction of physical capital than from a destruction of hu-
man capital. The reason is the following. After a war, physical capital
is scarce, and the return to savings and investments in physical capital
is therefore high. People then want to save and accumulate at a high
rate, and the original ratio of physical capital to GDP is restored in a
relatively short time. This might explain the good growth perform-
ance of Western European economies after the physical destruction
during World War II. After a brain drain, however, the adjustment of
the economy would be slower. The reason is that the scarcity of hu-
man capital leads to high wages which, in turn, makes people reluc-
tant to spend time in school instead of working for a wage. This re-
tards the reconstruction of the human capital lost by the brain drain
and causes slower growth.4
3 According to the Lucas model, long-run growth only depends on the productivity
of the education sector (together with other parameters describing people's prefer-
ences). Although increasing corporate taxes would have effects on short-run in-
vestments and growth, these effects would vanish in the long run, while the im-
provement in education would raise growth permanently, both directly and through
its impact on the choices of how much education to undertake.
4 In the Lucas model, a reduction in human capital will increase wages, even for the
low-skilled, since high-and low-skilled labor simply represent different efficiency
units of the same factor of production. In models where different levels of educa-
tion represent different factor inputs, the implications for the speed of recovery
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1.1.1. Future generations and inequality
In this section, we consider more closely the generational aspects of
education. The quality of educational achievements of one generation
impacts on the opportunities of the next generation. This happens via
some kind of cultural transmission mechanism both at school and in
the family. One problem that has been studied in the economic lit-
erature is that each generation might take its education decisions
without fully taking into account the positive impact of their educa-
tional attainments on the opportunities available to future genera-
tions. Some work (Azariadis and Drazen, 1990) has emphasised that
the consequences of these intergenerational links may be quite dra-
matic.
Assume, to give a simple example, that each person decides
whether or not to pursue education. The learning capabilities and,
thus, the amount of skills an individual can acquire through education
critically depend on the family (and social) background. In particular,
children learn faster if their parents are better educated. Skill acquisi-
tion is, therefore, a “cumulative process” through successive genera-
tions. Additionally, the availability of well-trained teachers and school
infrastructure is a precondition for young people to find it beneficial
to go to school rather than to work when young. Consider now two
consecutive generations. If the average family background of the
older generation is poor and/or good teachers are not available, the
younger generation will not become educated, and the stock of hu-
man capital in the society will not grow. This in turn will cause the
subsequent generation not to choose education, and so on. The
economy would therefore become locked into a low-education, low-
income trap, where the absence of human capital accumulation im-
plies low growth. This poverty trap could have been avoided if the
first generation had been induced to invest in education.
The poverty trap issue has been mainly discussed in the context of
developing economies. It may, however, illustrate problems which
even advanced societies may face when the incentives for a genera-
tion to accumulate knowledge and human capital are weak. For in-
stance, if redistributive policies induce a wage compression that re-
duces the incentives for the current generation to engage in education
(particularly higher education), the resulting shortage of human capital
after a brain-flight might be quite different from those of the Lucas model. See
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) for more details.
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may have rather persistent effects on growth, due to the mechanism
of intergenerational knowledge transmission described above.
We have so far analysed whether the population undertakes on av-
erage the right amount of education. Another important issue is
whether it is the most intellectually talented agents in the society who
undertake education. There are a number of reasons to believe that
this may not be the case in a market economy in the absence of pub-
lic intervention. People differ in both intellectual capabilities and
wealth (say, the wealth which their parents put at their disposal for
education purposes).5 If there were no borrowing contracts, wealth
would not matter for educational decisions. Talented people who
happen to be poor could borrow when young to finance their study,
paying back their debt out of their future income. However, in reality,
the access of poor people to private lending for financing their edu-
cation is severely limited. Thus, the access to education tends to be
distorted in favour of the rich. Apart from concerns for justice, this
problem would cause an inefficient resource allocation, and poten-
tially reduce economic growth.
Another reason for inefficient allocation of talent and bias due to
wealth inequality would be one in which education (especially higher
education) has both a consumption and an investment value. In other
words, not only does education increase an individual’s future pro-
ductivity and wages, but it also carries with it a status value. If this
status value is a “luxury good” (i.e. people care more about it the
wealthier they are), then for given economic incentives to take educa-
tion, children from wealthier families would find education more at-
tractive than kids from poorer families. This argument accords with
recent empirical evidence (Sjögren, 1999) that, in Sweden, children
from lower class families tend to be more responsive in their educa-
tional and career choices to economic incentives than children from
upper class families. To the extent that this argument is relevant,
misallocation of talents would tend to be particularly severe in coun-
tries where policies of wage compression (i.e. reductions of educa-
tional premium) make economic incentives less important relative to
status effects.
Another important consideration is that “peer effects” matter, i.e.
individuals’ achievements in school tend to be better, the higher the
intellectual potential of their schoolmates. These observations are re-
5 Bergman (1999) studies economic growth and the choice of education under such
assumptions.
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lated to an important policy issue concerning which system is best to
finance education (Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Benabou, 1996;
Aghion and Howitt, 1998). Assume that children from rich families
start up with more human capital than those from poor families, due
to a family background effect. Is it better—from an efficiency stand-
point—to bring together more and less advantaged kids, or, rather to
segregate them?
Consider, to address the point, two polar models of school fi-
nancing which would achieve rather opposite results. At one extreme,
education is financed by local communities where each community is
populated by families that have identical wealth per household. In this
scenario, there will be rich neighbourhoods where parents are willing
to pay high school fees and kids have high quality schools, and poor
neighbourhoods where parents can only pay low school fees and
where schools are of low quality. Peer effects will reinforce this segre-
gation. The opposite extreme is a system where schools are financed
by centralised nation-wide funding, and all schools in the country
provide services of identical quality. Since location is less important
for quality of schooling, neighbourhoods will tend to be less segre-
gated, i.e. people with different wealth levels will be found in each
neighbourhood. These two systems can be regarded as stylised repre-
sentations of the US and the Swedish (as well as other Continental
European) school systems, respectively.
Clearly, the former system will tend to perpetuate (or even exacer-
bate) initial inequality in the human capital distribution, while the lat-
ter would induce equalisation. But which system will promote faster
growth? This question is addressed by Benabou (1996). According to
his work, the extent of inequality in human capital is detrimental for
human capital accumulation and growth, irrespective of the way the
school system is financed. It turns out that if one takes inequality as
given, it is ambiguous which financing system maximises short-term
growth. On the one hand, in the integrated system, the poorly edu-
cated benefit from interacting with students with more human capital,
but, on the other hand, those with more human capital are harmed by
the presence of the less fortunate students. This ambiguity is, how-
ever, removed when considering long-run growth, i.e. when taking into
account the long-run effects over time of the schooling system on
inequality and prosperity. Nation-wide financed school systems tend
to decrease inequality over time and, thus, induce a better growth per-
formance in the long-run. In summary, while it is unclear which sys-
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tem maximises short-run growth, the nation-wide funded system is
unambiguously better for long-term growth.
1.2. Generation of new ideas and learning-by-doing
Overall, the theory discussed in the previous section supports the
view that educational systems stressing equalisation of opportunities
and integration are desirable not only on grounds of justice, but also
on grounds of efficiency and long-run growth. Some recent theories
point, however, to forces which may alter this conclusion. According
to an important branch of modern growth theory, the engine of
growth lies not in education in general, but in a restricted subset of
economic activities producing technological innovation (Aghion and
Howitt, 1992, 1998; Romer, 1990). These activities demand inten-
sively very specific and “advanced” skills, and the rate of growth of an
economy will depend on the availability of these skills in the society.
One conclusion is that a country should invest in the creation of
an intellectual and scientific elite. In other words, for the purpose of
promoting growth, it is not really important to have well-educated
blue-collar workers, but, rather, to have some excellent higher educa-
tion institutions which prepare competent managers, engineers, etc.
who can engage in innovative activities. In particular, given a certain
school budget, this theory would stress the importance of using re-
sources to extract the maximum potential from the most gifted pupils
rather than targeting the average, or the most disadvantaged students.
The rationale for such elitist educational policies would be to pro-
mote the formation of skills that can be used for innovative activities
and growth. This would benefit the entire society, including the low-
skilled population. For example, the social benefits generated by the
activity of a skilled engineer or medical researcher might go well be-
yond the return which they can privately appropriate. Thus, unless the
government intervenes, a market economy provides too weak private
incentives for capable students to engage in these professions.
One reason why the market fails is the following. Innovations can
be patented and patents sold to firms, creating a profit for innovators.
This provides an incentive to carry out innovative activity. The flow
of new ideas associated with innovations, however, will also inspire
additional research which were not taken into account when the in-
novation was first conceived. Since only a limited part, if any, of these
additional benefits is received by the original innovators, the society
provides too little private incentive for production of new knowledge.
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This argument suggests that subsidies targeted directly to increase the
profitability of research activities would be desirable. Public invest-
ments in support of higher education programs, increasing the supply
of skills which are used intensively in research activities, would be an-
other policy option to enhance efficiency and growth.
Once again, there are important linkages between the labour mar-
ket structure and educational policies. To strengthen the incentives
for young agents to acquire the skills needed to carry on innovation-
oriented activities, it is necessary that a significant wage premium be
attached to them. In a society with a highly compressed wage struc-
ture, these incentives tend to be particularly weak. This exacerbates
the under-provision of research-oriented skills. To compensate for
this distortion, government intervention can make human capital ac-
cumulation attractive via a generous policy of subsidies and student
loans. The problem with this approach is that—unless these policies
are carefully targeted to a few specific areas of knowledge—they can
make higher education in general attractive, while failing to induce the
desired emphasis on those areas of specialisation that are crucial to
promote economic growth. Thus, a society may tend to over-invest in
certain areas of knowledge (some of which one might wish to keep
alive, but for consumption rather than investment purposes) and, yet,
suffer from a scarcity of skills in other crucial sectors.
This discussion tends to go against the earlier conclusions in fa-
vour of an egalitarian rather than elitist approach. Although the ar-
guments presented in this section should be kept in mind, we believe,
however, that the stress on an elitist approach should not be overem-
phasised. Some recent literature even argues that the role of research
as the fundamental engine of growth should be de-emphasised
(Young, 1993). The theory of research-driven growth argues that re-
search provides more and more productive techniques over time, and
that these are implemented quickly. This may, however, be a rather
unrealistic description of the process of growth and technological de-
velopment. Many historians think, for instance, that most of the in-
novations and technologies associated with the British Industrial
Revolution were available long before they were used in factories
(Hobsbawn, 1968; Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986). The process of in-
dustrialisation in the Western world did not coincide with a boom of
research activity, but, rather, with the formation of a workforce capa-
ble to adapt to the needs of the factory system, development of en-
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trepreneurial skills and development of capital markets (Acemoglu
and Zilibotti, 1997).
A more realistic description of the process of growth is one where
basic research activity provides a stock of public knowledge which
can potentially improve the productive capacity of a society. But be-
tween the original innovation and the full exploitation of its potential,
there is a process of what can be called “secondary innovation” taking
place in a more scattered fashion in the productive sectors of the
economy. The main force in this process is learning-by-doing.
While basic research requires highly skilled workers, the efficiency
of the process of learning-by-doing might, arguably, depend on the
average human capital of the labour force in the society. Translating
this theory into a concrete example, the secret of the success of the
US as the technological leader in the world is not the mere availability
of highly qualified engineers trained at Stanford University and oper-
ating in Silicon Valley, but, rather, a combination of the highly skilled
engineers and the high average quality of the American labour force
(which has the highest percentage of secondary school attainment and
completion in the world). This has enabled the rapid and efficient im-
plementation of new ideas and techniques in ordinary productive ac-
tivities.
Once the complementarity between basic and secondary innova-
tion is acknowledged, economic theory stresses the importance of
having both a high average level of human capital in the population
and centres of excellence in higher education that train a limited
number of highly qualified individuals for innovation-oriented activi-
ties.
1.2.1. Education and skill-biased technical change
A major argument for promoting human capital accumulation is pro-
vided by the extensive recent literature on growth and skill-biased
technical change. Many authors have argued that technological devel-
opment in the last thirty years has reduced the relative demand for
unskilled versus skilled workers, making aggregate labour productivity
more dependent today than in the past on the availability of a well-
trained and well-educated labour force (Katz and Murphy, 1995;
Berman et al, 1998).6
6 See also Calmfors and Holmlund (2000) for a discussion of this issue.
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There are two fundamental arguments that explain why techno-
logical change may have become skill-biased. Firstly there has been a
progressive reduction (documented by the empirical literature) in the
price of capital relative to that of labour in the industrialised world
(Krusell et al, 2000). Capital—it is argued—acts as a substitute for
unskilled labour and as a complement to skilled labour, thereby in-
creasing its productivity and demand. Capital-intensive techniques
require more maintenance services, and the activity of workers who
can operate specific equipment, e.g. computers. For instance, the in-
troduction of computerised assembly lines reduces the need for un-
skilled workers, while demanding qualified workers to control the
process. Thus, as a result of the falling price of capital equipment,
firms have switched their demand away from technologies using low-
skilled workers into technologies that use more capital and high-
skilled workers. This change in the relative demand of skills has
caused a fall in the price of unskilled labour and an increase in the
returns to education in flexible labour markets like that of the US. In
Europe, where institutional factors tend to compress the wage struc-
ture, the adjustment has instead tended to take the form of an in-
crease in the unemployment rate for low-skilled workers.
The alternative theory notes that during the late 1960s and early
1970s, there has been an exceptional increase in educational attain-
ment and in the number of college graduates in the US (Acemoglu,
1998; Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1999). These changes, caused by par-
ticular events such as conscription in the Vietnam war, would have
first caused a decrease in the wage premium to education (which was
in fact observed during the 1970s), but later generated an increase in
research activity directed at creating new technologies which demand
skilled labour. Since the US accounts for a very large share of the
technological innovation in the world (35 per cent of the world ex-
penditure in R&D originates in the US), this would have had an im-
pact on the nature of technology development in the world as a
whole. This change in the direction of technology development may
have caused, over time, an increase in earning inequality between
educated and non-educated workers. This means that the rest of the
world, which depends to a large extent on innovations in the US,
must raise the average educational attainments of the working popu-
lation, in order to benefit from the new technologies generated.
This mechanism—i.e. the acceleration of skill-biased research and
innovation—may have been reinforced by other factors, such as, es-
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pecially, the increase in the volume of international trade between de-
veloped and developing countries (Wood, 1994). The labour force in
developing countries is, on average, less educated than in developed
countries. A reduction in the barriers to trade would induce, accord-
ing to standard economic theory, an increase in the inequality be-
tween educated and non-educated workers in developed countries,
even if there were no changes in the pattern of technology develop-
ment. Thus, the effect of trade liberalisation would per se increase the
demand for educated workers in industrialised countries.
Although different theories differ in their explanation of why re-
cent technical change has been skill-biased, there is little dispute on its
occurrence. This means that the future prosperity in industrialised
economies will depend, even more than in the recent past, on the
human capital of their workforce. While the market mechanism—via
increases in the education premium—does contribute to incentives to
undertake the socially desirable additional human capital investment,
these incentives may be weaker in economies where the market ad-
justment is largely distorted by institutional constraints (such as e.g.
wage compression). Although there is evidence of increasing wage
inequality in some European countries, like Sweden, educational pol-
icy will have to take continual account of the impact of technological
change on the growing need for a highly qualified and educated la-
bour force.
2. Empirical results
There is a substantial body of empirical literature which has tried to
assess the importance of human capital and education for economic
growth. The standard approach (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Barro,
1999) is to explain the growth rates of different countries by a set of
explanatory variables including human capital indicators, institutional
variables (political instability, rule of law, democracy, etc.), policy
variables (government consumption as a percentage of GDP, tax
distortions, etc.), investment rates and initial GDP per capita. The
standard finding is that an increase in the average years of schooling
of the working population has positive and significant effects on
growth.
Different indicators for human capital have been used. Barro
(1999) finds that a one-year increase in the average secondary and
higher education of the working population causes an increase in
GDP per capita growth by .72 per cent per year (everything else being
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held constant). This means that a significant part of the differences in
growth rates across countries can be attributed to differences in the
human capital of the labour force. For example, according to the data
set used by Barro, the average years of secondary and post-secondary
schooling in the US, Sweden and France in 1990 were, respectively,
6.2, 4.2 and 2.7. According to these estimates, the component of
growth attributable to human capital differences would cause the an-
nual growth rate of the US to be 1.4 per cent higher than that of
Sweden, and the growth rate of Sweden to be 1.1 per cent higher than
that of France. Human capital would account for even larger differ-
ences when comparisons are made between developed and develop-
ing countries. For instance, the difference in growth rates between
Sweden and an average African country attributable to human capital
differences would be 2.6 per cent per annum.
These results suggest that the stock of human capital is an impor-
tant determinant of growth. One would expect, however, that differ-
ences in growth rates, and not just in the initial stock, of human capital,
would matter. Economic theory suggests that a country which invests
a lot in education and, as a result, substantially increases the average
human capital of its labour force, should grow faster.7 The evidence
on the effects of human capital growth are, however, less clear. Ben-
habib and Spiegel (1994) analyse how differences in growth rates of
GDP per capita can be explained by differences in the growth rates (as
opposed to the stocks) of human capital across countries, and find no
significant effects. This finding is consistent with panel studies look-
ing simultaneously at differences over time and across countries
(Caselli et al, 1996; Islam, 1995).
There is, thus, robust empirical evidence that countries with a
better educated labour force, ceteris paribus, perform better in terms of
growth. However, there is less robust evidence that countries that
have improved their educational achievements have grown faster.
This puzzling finding − which stands in contrast to the results of a
large body of micro-empirical literature suggesting that education
substantially improves individual productivity (Angrist and Krueger,
1991; Björklund, 2000) − may well reflect problems with the meas-
urement of human capital, rather than a failure of the predictions of
7 Bils and Klenow (2000) stress the reverse causality; if education is a normal good,
then growth in productivity and output should increase the demand for higher edu-
cation.
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economic theory. Krueger and Lindahl (1998) argue, for instance, that
changes in human capital over time are measured less precisely than
differences between the stocks of human capital across countries.
They show that this lack of precise measurement would tend to bias
the econometric results towards finding no effects of changes in hu-
man capital on growth. Once Krueger and Lindahl adjust for this type
of statistical problem, they find evidence that countries that have a
higher growth rate of human capital indeed tend to grow faster.
Finally, there is some evidence that the quality of education mat-
ters. Barro (1999) supports this claim, using information on test
scores for science, reading, and mathematics, which are available for
51 countries. In particular, countries with better science scores seem
to be doing significantly better in terms of growth. The same is true,
although less clearly, for test scores in mathematics. When these indi-
cators of quality of schooling are taken into account, the average years
of secondary and higher schooling still constitute an important expla-
nation of growth, although the quantitative effect falls by about one-
half. This suggests, as one would expect, that both the quality and
quantity of schooling have an important effect on growth.
3. Implications for Sweden
What message does the growth literature convey for Sweden and
Swedish educational policy? From a macro perspective, it is remark-
able to observe that Sweden, while being the fastest growing country
in the world between 1870 and 1970, has subsequently been bypassed
by fourteen OECD countries in terms of GNP per capita (Lindbeck,
2000). From now on, these countries are labelled the C14. One possi-
ble explanation could be, according to Leamer and Lundborg (1997),
that Sweden has had less human capital accumulation than the C14
group. In this section, we assess the validity of this claim by reviewing
human capital accumulation, educational participation, and the flow
of graduates in selected fields in Sweden relative to other OECD
countries.
3.1. Human capital in Sweden
In order to understand the role of human capital accumulation (edu-
cation) in accounting for Swedish growth performance, we present a
number of measures of educational performance for Sweden and
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contrast them with corresponding measures for other OECD coun-
tries (see also Edin, Fredriksson and Holmlund, 1993).
3.1.1. Human capital stocks
To measure the growth in human capital across countries, we use data
from Barro and Lee (1993), who base their estimates on various
UNESCO reports.8 Figure 1 shows a standard measure of the stock
of human capital—the average years of schooling for the adult popu-
lation over 25.9 The graph shows that during the whole period 1960-
90, the stock of human capital in Sweden was substantially larger than
in the C14 countries, but substantially lower than in the US.10 The
C14 figures are based on population weighted averages. In fact, be-
tween 1970 and 1990 Sweden increased its educational advantage
over the C14 from .7 years to 1.2 years! Sohlman (1999) confirms this
picture. Using OECD data, she shows that Sweden's position in terms
of average human capital, relative to main competitor (OECD)
countries, improved during the 1970s and remained constant during the
1980s and 1990s. However, if we look at the average years of higher
education (Figure 2), the expansion of Swedish educational attain-
ment is practically identical to that of the C14. Sweden has had a .1
year lead over C14 throughout the period.
These data show that the stock of human capital, as measured by
the average years of education of the population aged 25 and over,
has not declined in Sweden, relative to the C14 countries. Therefore,
it is unlikely that changes in the average human capital stock can ex-
plain the slowdown in Swedish economic growth.
8 Barro and Lee's database has been widely used as the main source of information
for empirical growth studies across countries. It contains information at five-years
intervals for 126 countries for the period 1960-90.
9 There are, of course, some problems associated with this measure: education does
not necessarily measure skills, and education is heterogeneous, so degrees in e.g.
engineering and humanities are counted alike.
10 The sharp increase from 1975 to 1980, followed by a decrease from 1980 to 1985
suggests that the observation for average years of schooling in the US in 1980 (Fig-
ure 1) is likely to be subject to some measurement error. However, even if we ig-
nore this observation, the fact that the average years of schooling in the US (i) is
higher; and (ii) has been growing faster since 1960 than in Sweden and the C14
countries, remains clear.
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Figure 1. Average years of education for population over 25
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Figure 2. Average years of higher education for population
over 25
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3.1.2. Human capital accumulation—flows
We now turn our focus to the flows of human capital. Figure 3 shows
the participation rates in secondary education 1970-1995 for Sweden,
the C14 and the US, according to UNESCO Statistical Database and
UNESCO (1998). The graph suggests that participation in secondary
education was roughly equal across Sweden, C14 and the US between
1970 and 1990. Due to the so called Kunskapslyftet (an expansion of
secondary education for grown-ups as part of a policy offensive
against unemployment—see Sohlman, 1999) the participation rate in
Sweden increased in the mid 1990s.11
Figure 3. Gross enrolment ratio for secondary education
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11 This statistic is computed by taking the number of people in secondary education
divided by the size of the population in the relevant age groups, e.g. 13-18 for Swe-
den. As “Kunskapslyftet” puts a number of middle-aged individuals into secondary
education, the gross enrolment ratios can exceed 100 per cent, as it appears in Fig-
ure 3 for Sweden after 1992. The database is accessible on
http://unescostat.unesco.org/database/DBframe.htm.
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Figure 4. Gross enrolment ratio for tertiary education.
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Figure 4 shows the enrolment ratios in higher education for the
period 1970-1995.12 For Sweden, enrolment rose by less than 8 per-
centage points between 1970 and 1988, well below the increase for
the C14 (over 17 percentage points) and the US (over 14 percentage
points). Thereafter, there has been a substantial expansion of enrol-
ment in higher education (16 percentage point increase between 1988
and 1995), in line with the expansion in the C14 countries (+17 per-
centage points) and the US (+12.5 percentage points). The differ-
ences in the Swedish pattern of development across the two sub-
periods may be explained in two ways: changes in wage premia and
changes in unemployment. Fredriksson (1997), for instance, argues
that the changes in wage premia in 1968-1991 can account for most
of the changes in enrolment during that time period, although
changes in unemployment also matter significantly. During the 1970s,
12 The jump in enrolment in 1975 for Sweden (Figure 4) is due to a change to a
broader definition of higher education without a revision of previous figures. Note
also that the observations for the years 1975-1979 are dashed as the change of defi-
nition in 1975 was accompanied by a significant measurement error which was not
corrected before 1980.
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wages became increasingly compressed—the after-tax premium on
higher education declined from 11.5 per cent in 1968 to .5 per cent in
1981 (Edin, Fredriksson and Holmlund, 1993)—while unemployment
remained very low. During the 1980s, however, the after-tax wage
premium started to increase (from .5 per cent in 1981 to 4.5 per cent
in 1991). Concerning unemployment, it is well known that this rose
sharply in the early 1990s. This may have increased the incentives for
people to undertake higher education (low unemployment increases
the opportunity cost of going to school, as also argued by Leamer and
Lundborg, 1997). Thus, both increased wage premia and higher un-
employment may have contributed to bringing Sweden back to the
trend of the other industrialised countries in terms of enrolment in
tertiary education (note, however, that this trend started already in the
late 1980s, before the rise of unemployment).
Cross-country comparisons of enrolment rates are somewhat
problematic, due to differences in school systems. Bearing this pro-
viso in mind, it is interesting to notice that enrolment rates in the C14
countries surpassed those in Sweden during the mid 1980s, while the
US rates remained at a 20-30 per cent higher level throughout the
whole period. Although the differences between Sweden and the C14
do not look very large—about 6 percentage points—and have not
increased since 1988, we find it alarming that Sweden, which had tra-
ditionally substantially higher educational achievements, has lagged
behind the major industrialised countries since 1985.13
Next, we turn to the composition of education. Using data from the
OECD Educational Database, we explore whether the composition
of education  in Sweden has evolved in a different way than in the
C14 and the US. In particular, one could conjecture that, although
higher education was expanding, the expansion might have been
driven by enrolment in fields that are less important for growth, while
the same has not occurred in other OECD countries. The data, how-
ever, do not support this conjecture. The number of university level
science graduates in 1994 (engineering, math, and natural sciences) as
a percentage of the total number of university graduates is higher for
13 These findings are consistent with Sohlman (1999). She documents, for instance,
that, in terms of higher educational attainment, Sweden's position relative to the
main competitors is weaker for the younger cohorts in the labor force: Sweden
ranks fifth, third and second among its main competitors for the age groups 25-34,
35-44 and 45-64, respectively.
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Sweden (25.5 per cent) than for both the C14 (22.9 per cent) and the
US (15.4 per cent).14
We also consider the time series evidence concerning the number
of graduating engineers. The supply of newly educated engineers
could be of special importance, if they acquire cutting-edge knowl-
edge in school and the adoption of new technologies, in driving
growth (Section 1.2). Indeed, Murphy et al. (1991) find that engineers
matter significantly for growth. Table 1 shows the number of engi-
neering graduates per 100,000 inhabitants in Sweden and the US in
the period between 1971 and 1994 (corresponding data for all C14
countries are, unfortunately, not available).15 As is evident from the
table, the number of Swedish engineering graduates was substantially
below the corresponding US figure in 1970, irrespective of whether
we consider only Bachelor degrees or include Masters and Ph.D. de-
grees. By 1994, however, Sweden had basically caught up with and
surpassed the US in terms of undergraduate engineering degrees.
Cross-country comparisons of educational attainment, especially
disaggregated by field of study are always problematic. Hence, all
conclusions should be taken with caution. Our overall feeling is, how-
ever, that, even though the expansion of higher education was slower
in Sweden than in the C14 in 1978-1993, it seems unlikely that this
has been an important factor behind the economic slowdown.
Moreover, when considering a specific technology-oriented field of
study—engineering—the Swedish performance during this period
seems quite strong, even compared with the US.
14 When expressed as a proportion of the working population, however, the C14
and the US had, respectively, about 25 per cent and 50 per cent more science
graduates than Sweden in 1994. Note that these figures concern university degrees
only, while Figure 4 include all forms of higher education. The data from the
OECD Educational Database can be freely accessed at
http://www.oecd.org/cde/EDU_UOE/datasets/RGRADSTY.html. For meth-
odological details, see Barro and Lee (1993).
15 We would like to thank Johan Sittenfeld at Civilingenjörsförbundet for providing
data on the number of graduating civil engineers.
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Table 1. The number of engineering graduates per 100,000
inhabitants in the US and Sweden
1971 1980 1985 1990 1994
Sweden:
Civil Engineers
26.8 35.3 38.4 44.7 59.0
USA:
Bachelors
38.7 45.7 60.3 49.4 46.0
USA:
Masters + PhD
+ Bachelors
54.2 58.1 75.9 67.5 67.1
Note: “Masters + Ph.D. + Bachelors” refer to the total number of engineering de-
grees awarded at all university levels.
Source: Civilingenjörsförbundet and Statistical Abstract of the United States 1997.
3.1.3. Quality of education
Lastly, we turn to the quality of the educational system. As discussed
above, cross-country evidence suggests that the test scores in science
and mathematics matter significantly for growth. Table 2 reports the
available test scores for 13-year old students (once again the data set
is from Barro and Lee, 1993). The scores in mathematics reveal that
the performance of Sweden was poor, relative to other countries, in
1964 and 1982 (the lowest scores among all sampled countries).
However, it improved somewhat during the 1990s—nudging past the
US, for instance. In science, which, according to Barro (1999), has the
strongest predictive power for growth, the performance of Swedish
students is about average (although slightly worse in 1993-98 than in
1984).
Any conclusion based on these limited observations has to be
taken with caution. Overall, the evidence collected suggests that the
quality of education provided by Swedish (primary) schools is of an
average standard relative to that of other OECD countries. As dis-
cussed in Section 2, there is evidence that the quality of schooling
(especially as measured by test scores in mathematics and science)
exerts a positive influence on growth. Accordingly, there would ap-
pear to be scope for policies that aim to improve the quality of the
Swedish educational system, especially in the areas of mathematics
and science. We see, however, no clear evidence of a deterioration
over time in the levels of knowledge of Swedish students relative to
other OECD countries. Thus, if knowledge in mathematics and sci-
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ence was equally important for growth in the 1960s as in the 1990s,
changes in the quality of the Swedish school system do not seem to
account for the disappointing growth performance of Sweden after
1970.
Table 2. International test scores in mathematics and science
Math Math Math Math Science Science Science Science Science
1964 1982-
1983
1988 1993-
1998
1970-
1972
1984 1988 1990-
1991
1993-
1998
Country
13 13 13 13 14 13 13 13 13
Canada 50.9 52.3 49.4 62 50.6 68.8 49.9
USA 25.4 46 47.4 47.6 27 55 47.9 67 50.8
Japan 46 63.5 57.1 39 67.3 53.1
Austria 50.9 51.9
Belgium 43.4 52.8 53.3 22.9 48.5
Denmark 46.5 43.9
Finland 37.7 48.2 25.6 61.7
France 30 53.5 49.2 68.6 45.1
Germany 36.3 48.4 29.6 49.9
Iceland 45.9 46.2
Ireland 50.4 50 46.9 63.3 49.5
Italy 23.1 55.7 69.9
Luxembourg 37.9
Holland 30.6 58.1 51.6 22.3 66 51.7
Norway 46.1 59.7 48.3
Sweden 21.9 43.5 47.7 27.1 61.3 48.8
Australia 27 49.8 30.8 59.3 50.4
Note: Test scores in mathematics and science for 13- and 14-years-old students: in-
ternational comparisons since 1964.
Source: Barro & Lee (1993).
4. Conclusions
This chapter has explored the relationship between education and
growth, and discussed the implications for Sweden.
Modern theories of economic growth emphasise the idea that edu-
cation is a key factor for sustained economic growth. Indeed, the em-
pirical literature documents robust evidence that countries with a
better educated labour force perform better in terms of growth.
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Moreover, some evidence suggest that countries which have increased
their educational achievements over time have improved their growth
performance.
We have reviewed the theories based on human capital accumula-
tion as the engine of growth. A major implication of these theories is
that a country’s growth rate could be permanently raised by increasing
the efficiency of the education sector and by inducing people to un-
dertake more education. We have stressed that an important part of
the policy of providing good educational services involves hiring
highly qualified, motivated and talented teachers, and providing them
with incentives to do a good job. In order for high-ability individuals
to be attracted to the teaching profession, teachers’ salaries should
reflect the importance that society places on this job and on its role in
promoting future growth.
We have also discussed the issue of whether an egalitarian or elitist
school system is better for promoting growth, excluding considera-
tions about social justice. While the implications of different theories
are fairly diverse, our view can be summarised as follows. We believe
that it is important to maintain the general egalitarian character of the
Swedish educational system, especially at the primary and secondary
level. At the same time, the theories of research-driven growth sug-
gest the importance of introducing a greater emphasis on rewarding
excellence, in particular in higher education. In our view, the entire
society would benefit from the establishment of top-notch research
centres which both promote basic research directly and can train
highly qualified students, especially in the areas where spillovers are
most important (engineering, computer science, medicine, economics
etc.).
We also believe that it is important that young people have mone-
tary incentives to undertake the “right” economic activities. The edu-
cational premium in Sweden is exceptionally low compared to other
countries (Asplund and Telhado Pereira, 1999, Table 4). Part of this is
due to an institutional compression of the wage structure relative to
the differences in labour productivity between employees with and
without a university degree.16 This implies that, in many cases, the
private return from choosing the “right” education is too low, and
fails to induce a socially desirable career choice.
16 An alternative view is presented in Edin and Holmlund (1995), who argue that the
fall in the wage premium for university graduates between 1970 and the mid 1980’s
can be accounted for by the increase in the supply of university graduates.
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We have argued that in recent years the cost of this distortion may
have increased due to the (skill-biased) nature of technical progress,
which, in Sweden, has been translated only to a very limited extent
into increasing wage inequality.17 Some of the effects of this distor-
tion on the educational choices of individuals may have already mani-
fested themselves in lower enrolment ratios in higher education com-
pared to the other major industrialised countries. While this has not
yet given rise to a large reduction in the Swedish human capital stock
relative to that of other countries, the continuation of this tendency
might be highly detrimental for future economic growth. We advo-
cate, therefore, labour market reforms which introduce greater flexi-
bility into the wage structure. At the same time, public policy should
strengthen the commitment to education and research and promote
continued growth in investment in schooling.
17 Flam (1987) and Lindqvist (1999) also study the costs of wage compression, but
their analyses lie outside of the endogenous growth framework.
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